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IS IT CONSISTENT OR NOT INCONSISTENT? THE
QUESTION REMAINS UNANSWERED FOLLOWING
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION v.
WASHINGTON NATURAL GAS CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 1980, the 96th Congress enacted the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA)1 "primarily to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites by placing the ultimate financial responsibility for
cleanup on those responsible for hazardous wastes."2 In further-
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCILA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992)). "Better known as the
'Superfund' Act, [CERCLA authorizes EPA] to take action to clean up hazardous
waste sites." United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 499 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986).
2. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1500 (6th Cir. 1989),
(citing Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 823 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1057 (1990)). See also Matter of Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889,
894 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting CERCLA § 107 "provides for the recovery of response
costs from all persons responsible for the release of a hazardous substance" to
effectuate its purpose of facilitating "prompt clean-up of hazardous waste sites");
J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing WaLs for proposi-
tion that "[t]he primary purpose [of CERCLA is] 'the prompt cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites.' "); United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 1991 WL 333694, *6
(W.D. Pa. 1991) (stating "[CERCLA] does not exact punishment. Rather it creates
a reimbursement obligation on any person judicially determined responsible for
the costs of remedying hazardous conditions . . . ."); Artesian Water Co. v. New
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (D. Del. 1987) (noting that wherever possi-
ble, "CERCLA places the ultimate financial burden of toxic waste cleanup on those
responsible for creating the harmful conditions."), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.
1988); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc. 616 F. Supp. 822, 826 (D. Colo. 1985) ("[I]n enact-
ing CERCLA, Congress sought expeditious clean-up of hazardous waste sites.");
City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
("CERCLA is designed to facilitate the prompt clean-up of hazardous material by
providing a means of financing both government and private actions and by plac-
ing the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for the danger."), recon-
sideration denied, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,007 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA with the enactment of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 42 U.S.C. § 9631. In addition to
financing governmental response activities, the Superfund may also be used by the
federal government to pay claims that arise from response actions brought by pri-
vate parties, as well as "to compensate federal or state governmental entities for
damage caused to natural resources." Artesian, 659 F. Supp. at 1277. "The
Superfund's funding sources include general revenue appropriations, certain envi-
ronmental taxes, monies recovered under CERCLA on behalf of the Superfund,
(401)
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ance of this goal, CERCLA enables federal and state governments
("public parties") as well as private parties who incur cleanup costs
to sue those parties that are "responsible for the generation, trans-
portation, or disposal of hazardous substances."3 CERCLA section
107(a) (4) (A) provides that a public party may seek recovery for "all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan."4 In Washington State Department of
Transportation v. Washington Natural Gas, Co. (WSDO7),5 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that CER-
CLA section 107(a) (4) (A) does not provide a state agency unfet-
tered discretion in its cleanup action of a hazardous waste site.6 In
WSDOT, the court held that a state agency, while able to enjoy a
presumption of consistency with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP),7 could not recover its response costs under CERCLA when
its actions rose to an "arbitrary and capricious" level.8
Part II of this note examines the statutory guidelines and legal
precedent concerning the differences between private and public
recovery of response costs; in particular, it focuses on the different
burdens of proof that must be met with respect to whether a party's
and CERCLA-authorized penalties and punitive damages." R W Meyer, 889 F.2d at
1500.
3. Artesian, 659 F. Supp. at 1277.
4. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). CERCLA
§ 107(a) (4) (B) provides that private parties may seek to recover "any other neces-
sary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan." Id. § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B).
5. 59 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1995).
6. Id.
7. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. Section 105, in pertinent part, provides
as follows:
(a) [The] section of the [national contingency] plan to be known as the
national hazardous substance response plan . . .shall establish proce-
dures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants, and contaminants, which shall include at a minimum:
(1) methods for discovering and investigating facilities at which haz-
ardous substances have been disposed of or otherwise come to be
located; (2) methods for evaluating, including analyses of relative
cost, and remedying any releases or threats of releases from facilities
which pose substantial danger to the public health or the environ-
ment; (3) methods and criteria for determining the appropriate ex-
tent of removal, remedy... ; (7) means of assuring that remedial
action measures are cost-effective over the period of potential expo-
sure to the hazardous substances or contaminated materials ....
Id. § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). The 1982 NCP is printed in 40 C.F.R. § 300.1-.86
(1982). The 1985 NCP, otherwise known as the National Oil and Hazardous Sub-
stances Pollution Contingency Plan, is found at 40 C.F.R. part 300 (1986).
8. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 805.
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response costs are incurred in a manner either "consistent" or "not
inconsistent" with the National Contingency Plan.9 Part III
presents the factual and procedural history of WSDOT 1 Part IV
reviews the reasoning behind the Ninth Circuit's opinion.I Part V
analyzes the court's decision, focusing on the court's determination
that while the Washington State Department of Transportation
(WSDOT) is a "State" within the meaning of CERCLA, it was never-
theless unable to recover its response costs because they were in-
curred in a manner "inconsistent" with the NCP.12 Finally, Part VI
suggests that the impact of the Ninth Circuit's decision will impede
future response actions of state and federal agencies in acting in a
"not inconsistent" manner with the NCP.13
9. For a discussion of the differences between private and public recovery
under CERCILA as it pertains to applicable burdens of proof, see infra notes 37-55,
61-64, and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of the WSDOT case,
see infra notes 98-129 and accompanying text.
11. For a full discussion of the reasoning of the WSDOT opinion, see infra
notes 130-175 and accompanying text.
12. CERCLA defines the terms "respond" and "response." CERCLA
§ 101 (25) provides as follows: "[t ] he terms 'respond' or 'response' means remove,
removal, remedy, and remedial action; all such terms (including the terms 're-
moval' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto." Id.
§ 101 (25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
CERCLA defines "remove" or "removal" as:
[T] he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the
environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such ac-
tions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed mate-
rial, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of
release.
Id. § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
CERCIA defines "remedy" or "remedial actions" as follows:
[T] hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of
or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or
minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate
to cause substantial danger'to present or future public health or welfare
or the environment.
Id. § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
For a critical analysis of the WSDOTcase, see infra notes 176-205 and accompa-
nying text.
13. "Response actions include remedial efforts to prevent or minimize re-
leases as well as attempts to remove hazardous substances entirely." B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992).
For a discussion of the impact of the WSDOTcase, see infra notes 206-211 and
accompanying text.
19961
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of CERCLA and the NCP
By enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to address two princi-
pal concerns. 14 First, Congress intended to immediately provide
the federal government with the necessary tools for "a prompt and
effective response to problems of national magnitude resulting
from hazardous waste disposal." 15 Second, Congress intended that
the parties "responsible for problems caused by the disposal of
chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying
the harmful conditions they created." 16
To guide state and federal response activities, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the National Contin-
gency Plan (NCP). 17 The NCP provides "overall federal policy for
14. CERCLA is a remedial statute, and accordingly, must be liberally con-
strued to achieve its two primary goals: enabling "EPA to respond efficiently and
expeditiously to toxic spills, and ... holding those parties responsible for the re-
leases liable for the costs of cleanup." Murtha, 958 F.2d at 1198. See also O'Neill v.
Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 719 n.2 (D.R.I. 1988) (stating "Congress intended broad
judicial interpretation of CERCLA in order to give full effect to two important
legislative purposes .. "), aff'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071
(1990); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (D. Del.
1987) (discussing CERCLA's attempt to create coherent answer to two related
problems: "emergency abatement of releases of hazardous substances into the en-
vironment and the response, both short- and long-term, to the presence of hazard-
ous wastes in existing disposal sites"), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
15. United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1418 (6th
Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1112 (D. Minn. 1982)). See alsoJ.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 584 F. Supp.
1005, 1009 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (acknowledging that in enacting CERCLA, Congress
intended for EPA to have authority "to respond quickly to environmental emer-
gencies"), aff 'd 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp.
615, 622 (D.N.H. 1988) (same).
In Akzo, the court discerned from the legislative history and the federal legisla-
tive design that "Congress did not intend to leave the cleanup under CERCLA
solely in the hands of the federal government." Akzo, 949 F.2d at 1418. Rather,
CERCLA, as amended by SARA in 1986, provides individual states with a signifi-
cant and purposeful role in the designation and formation of remedial actions
taken within their domain. Id.
16. Akzo, 949 F.2d at 1418 (citing United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)).
17. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1986). CERCLA provides that "[t]he term 'national
contingency plan' means the national contingency plan published under section
1321(c) of Title 33 or revised pursuant to section 9605 of [CERCLA]." CERCLA
§ 101(31), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(31). CERCLA § 105 provides for a National Contin-
gency Plan that "shall include a section ... to be known as the national hazardous
substance response plan which shall establish procedures and standards for re-
sponding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants .... "
Id. § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). See also Matter of Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3
F.3d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating "[tihe NCP identifies methods for investigat-
ing the environmental and health problems resulting from a release or threatened
release and criteria for determining the appropriate extent of response activi-
4
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the removal of hazardous substances."1 8 In particular, the NCP pro-
vides "methods for discovering and investigating sites at which haz-
ardous substances have been located, methods for remedying
releases of hazardous substances, and criteria for determining the
appropriate extent of response activities." 19 The statutory language
of CERCLA section 10720 provides that the nature of liability of a
responsible party differs depending on whether the party seeking to
recover its cleanup costs is a public or private party.2 1 In most
cases, the decision as to whether a party is a "State" or a "person"
within the meaning of CERCLA is straightforward. 22 Courts diverge
in their conclusions concerning requirements for recovering
cleanup costs incurred in a manner "consistent" or "not inconsis-
tent" with the NCP.2 3
ties."); Ambrogi v. Gould, 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (stating NCP
provides "both criteria and procedures for selection of the most cost-effective and
environmentally sound alternative for remedying the site").
18. United States v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 1986 WL 7565, *3 (E.D.
Pa. 1986). See also Channel Master Satellite v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373,
394 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (stating "the purpose of the NCP 'is to give some consistency
and cohesiveness to response planning and actions.'") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 30 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6133).
19. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1489 (D.NJ.),
aff'd, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
20. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) provides as follows:
[A] ny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous sub-
stance, shall be liable for-(A) all costs of removal or remedial action in-
curred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan.
CERCILA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (emphasis added).
21. See Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 470 (D. Mass.
1991) ("[A]s between the United States Government and any State . . . and any
other person ... CERCLA provides differential access to remedies and differential
burdens in establishing access to those remedies."); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., (NEPPACO), 810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986)
(stating " 'not inconsistent' is not, at least for purposes of statutory construction
and not syntax, the same as 'consistent.' "), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). In
NEPPACO, the court noted the fine distinction that the "statutory scheme [of
CERCLA] ... differentiates between governmental and nongovernmental entities
in allocating the burden of proof of whether response costs are consistent with the
NCP." Id. at 747.
22. For a discussion of cases discussing various interpretations of "State," see
infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
23. See 1 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 6.3, at 585 (1992) (stating that federal courts are more willing to apply fairly
loose standard pertaining to consistency in public recovery actions and more will-
ing to apply fairly restrictive standard in private recovery actions). For a discussion
1996] 405
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B. The Various Interpretations of "State"
While CERCLA statutorily defines the term "person," it does
not provide any guidance regarding the meaning of the term
"State. '24 Consequently, federal courts have reached differing con-
clusions concerning what constitutes a "State" within the meaning
of CERCLA.
1. A Municipality is a "State"
At least one federal district court has held that a municipality is
a "State" for purposes of recovery of response costs incurred in the
cleanup of hazardous waste. In Town of Boonton v. Drew Chemical
Co.,25 the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
adopted a broad reading of the statutory definition of "State," re-
jecting the defendants' contention that Congress intended to ex-
clude municipalities from CERCLA section 101 (27).26 The court
focused on the language of section 101 (27), noting that CERCLA
provides that the term "State" shall "include" the different entities
listed in section 101 (27).27 Moreover, the court viewed the term
"includes" as a term of enlargement, rather than as a term of re-
striction when used in statutory construction. 28 Finally, the court
determined that the enumerated list in section 101 (27) can be ex-
tended by the courts to the degree that would be consistent with
CERCLA's broad remedial purposes.2 9
of the consistent/not inconsistent language, see infra notes 37-50, 58-65 and ac-
companying text.
24. CERCLA § 101 (21) defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United
States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body." CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
25. 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985).
26. Id. The Boonton defendants reasoned that "because Congress specifically
referred to 'states or political subdivisions' in § 9604(d) of the Act [CERCLA], it
must have intended to exclude municipalities wherever no reference to political
subdivisions was made in the Act." Id. at 666.
27. Id. CERCILA § 101(27) provides as follows:
The terms 'United States' and 'State' include the several States of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Com-
monwealth of the Northern Marianas, and any other territory or posses-
sion over which the United States has jurisdiction.
CERCLA § 101 (27), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27).
28. Boonton, 621 F. Supp. at 666 (D.N.J. 1985). ("[The term 'includes'] con-
veys the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically
enumerated . .. .") (quoting SINGER, N., 24 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 47.07 (4th ed. 1984)).
29. Id. at 666-67. The district court also noted that "Congress has frequently
defined 'state' broadly to mean the fifty states and a variety of other governmental
6
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2. A Municipality or Political Subdivision is not a "State"
Looking to the plain language of CERCLA, several federal
courts have held that since a municipality or political subdivision
needs to look to the state or federal government for its authority, a
municipality or political subdivision is not a "State" within the
meaning of CERCLA.30 For example, in City ofPhiladelphia v. Stepan
Chemical Co., 31 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania rejected the argument that because Congress
defined "State" broadly in other statutes,32 "State" should be inter-
preted to mean "municipality" in CERCLA.33
Similarly, in Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co.,34 the court rejected
the argument that a political subdivision should be considered a
"State" in order to further the broad remedial purposes of CER-
CLA.3 5 Rather, the court noted that a "town" is different from the
listed entities in section 101 (27) because it is not a sovereign. 36
subdivision and entities such as municipalities." Id. (citations omitted). See also
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing broad
remedial purposes of CERCLA); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (stating CERCLA should not be construed nar-
rowly as it would frustrate broad remedial purposes of CERCLA of enabling gov-
ernment to respond effectively and promptly to environmental emergencies and
holding parties responsible for hazardous waste).
30. See City of New York v. Chemical Waste Disposal Corp., 836 F. Supp. 968
(E.D.N.Y. 1993); Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469 (D. Mass.
1991); City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1989), recon-
sideration denied, 1983 WL 20296 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
31. 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
32. Id. at 1488-89. See Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 829
(6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that because Congress included "political subdivision"
in some sections of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, absence of such
term in Congress' express preemption provision not intended to mean that Con-
gress implicitly meant to include such term in statutory definition of "State"), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 801 (1987).
33. Stepan Chem., 713 F. Supp. at 1489. In Stepan Chem., the court noted that
in discerning the intent of Congress in enacting a particular statutory provision,
the starting point is always the plain language. Id. at 1488. Further, the court
stated that absent support in the statute for the plaintiff's argument that "state"
should be interpreted to include "municipality," the court was unwilling to attri-
bute such intent to Congress. Id. at 1489.
34. 755 F. Supp. 469 (D. Mass. 1991).
35. Id. at 472-73. The Bedford court stated "[t]o be sure, CERCLA is a 'far
reaching remedial statute' whose 'clear purpose ... is to ensure prompt and effec-
tive cleanup of hazardous wastes and the restoration of environmental quality.' "
Id. at 472 (citations omitted). The purpose of CERCLA, however, should be effec-
tuated "within the framework of legislation designed to secure other goals as well."
Id.
36. Id. at 471. The Bedford court noted that the sovereigns listed in CERCLA
§ 101(27) do not depend on states to grant them power. Id. See supra note 27 for
textual language of CERCILA § 101 (27), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (27).
1996]
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C. Differences Between Private Recovery and Public Recovery
under CERCLA
CERCLA provides for both private and public recovery of re-
sponse costs. 3 7 In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co., (NEPACCO)38 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit concluded that when a governmental entity
seeks recovery for its response costs, the claim is a public recovery
action.39 Private parties seeking recovery of response costs must
show that their costs have been incurred in a manner consistent with
the applicable NCP, while public parties must show that their re-
sponse costs have been incurred in a manner not inconsistent with
the NCP.40 The allocation of these different burdens of proof has
significant consequences on a party's ability to recover its response
costs.
1. Private Recovery under CERCLA
In a private recovery action, defendants are liable for those
"necessary costs" incurred by another party "consistent" with the ap-
plicable NCP.41 Compliance with the NCP is one of the most cru-
37. CERCLA § 107 implicitly provides for public and private cost recovery ac-
tions by its language in subsections 107(a) (4) (A) and 107(a) (4) (B), which provide
that a responsible party is liable for the following: "(A) all costs of removal or reme-
dial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan
. .. CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (emphasis added). Courts
have interpreted this to mean that subsection (A) provides for public recovery
actions, while subsection (B) provides for private recovery actions. Wickland Oil
Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986).
In United States v. Mottolo, the court noted that while the term "costs" is not
statutorily defined in CERCLA, it is "consistently used to refer to costs of removal,
response, or remedial action incurred in connection with the release of or disposal
of hazardous wastes." 605 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.N.H. 1985). See also Ambrogi v.
Gould, 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1240 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (stating CERCLA does not explain
term "cost of response," rather, CERCLA defines concept of "response").
38. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
39. Id. at 747. Accordingly, the converse would also be true; when a non-
governmental entity is seeking recovery for its response costs, it is a private party
cost recovery action. See id. at 747 (explaining differences in allocations of bur-
dens of proof depending on whether case is governmental or non-governmental
response recovery action).
40. Id. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For textual language
of CERCLA § 107(a) (4), see supra note 20.
41. See supra note 20 for statutory language of CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B) pro-
viding for private recovery action.
"[C]onsistency is interpreted differently depending on the procedural posture
of the case." Robert A. Mullins, The Aftermath of Key Tronic: Implicationsfor Attorney's
Fee Awards, 24 ENvTL. L. 1513, 1523-24 (1994). For example, if a party seeks to
recover response costs incurred for the initial investigation and monitoring activ-
8
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cial elements of a private party's prima facie case.42 Private parties
who incur response costs are not entitled to a presumption of
consistency. 43
Federal courts have held that substantial compliance with the
NCP is sufficient to enable a party to recover response costs. 4
ity, the party may not need to prove compliance with the NCP to recover its re-
sponse costs. Id. at 1524. On the other hand, a party may need to prove
consistency with the NCP in a situation where the party is seeking damages as re-
sponse costs, or where the party has incurred significant costs. Id. (citations
omitted).
Most courts hold that the applicable NCP in a private recovery action is the
NCP in effect at the time the private party incurred the response costs, rather than
the version effective when the party initiated its response actions. See, e.g., NL In-
dus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Wickland Oil Terminals v.
Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1986); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union
Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1575 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle
County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1294 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
42. See A. Christian Worrell &Joseph B. Japp, 1:ivate Cost Recoveiy Under CER-
CLA for Hazardous Substance Cleanup: A Last Resort, 18 N. Ky. L. REv. 237, 247
(1991) (Winter Symposium). Some courts have defined a private party's primafa-
cie case as requiring proof of the following five elements: (1) the defendant is a
potentially responsible party; (2) that there has been a release or there is a threat
of a release of a hazardous substance "from the disposal or treatment of that haz-
ardous substance;" (3) the release or threatened release caused the plaintiff to
incur response costs; (4) the costs incurred are necessary costs of response; and
(5) the response is consistent with the NCP. Id. at 239-240. See also Artesian Water
Co., 851 F.2d at 648; Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-
53 (9th Cir. 1989); Amland Properties, Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F.
Supp. 784, 790 (D.N.J. 1989).
In the Ninth Circuit, whether a party acts in compliance with the NCP is an
issue that goes to damages, rather than to liability of the potentially responsible
party. Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir.
1988). See also Order on Motions for Partial SummaryJudgment at 11, Washington
State Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1995)
(discussing defendants' lack of reasons for court to deny WSDOT's motion for
summary judgment on issue of liability).
43. United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 899 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (citing
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 851
(W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by 810 F.2d 726, (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)).
A statutory presumption aids the party with the burden of proof and shifts the
burden of moving forward with evidence to the other party. Prokes v. Mathews,
559 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing Webre Steib Co. v. Commissioner, 324
U.S. 164, 170-71 (1945)). "Unlike a presumption, an inference does not affect the
burden of proof or the burden of going forward with the evidence." Id. at 1061.
44. See NL Industries, 792 F.2d at 898-99; Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,
Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1986); General Electric Co. v. Litton Business
Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949, 962 (W.D. Mo. 1989), aff'd General Electric v. Litton
Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937
(1991). But see Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v.JFD Electronics Corp., 748 F.
Supp. 373, 383 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (holding strict compliance necessary under 1985
NCP).
In the preamble to the 1990 NCP, EPA stated "'consistency with the NCP'
should be measured by whether the private party cleanup has . . . as a whole,
1996] 409
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However, noncompliance with regulations does not alone render a
private party's costs incurred in a cleanup inconsistent with the
NCP.45 Rather, in Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,46 the Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that response costs incurred by a private party may be
considered "consistent" with the NCP as long as the measures
would "promote the broader purposes of the plan."4 7 Similarly, in
Ti-County Business Campus Joint Venture v. Clow Corp., 48 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted
that the newer regulations require more lenience, expressly stating
that response actions should not be determined to be inconsistent
with the NCP because of "immaterial or insubstantial deviations
from the provisions of 40 C.F.R. part 300."49 Further, the First Cir-
cuit has adopted the standard that a potentially responsible party
must show that material noncompliance by the government with
the NCP resulted in "demonstrabl[y] excess costs." 50
Originally, federal courts determined that private parties were
required to obtain governmental approval for their cleanup actions
in order to seek recovery under CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (B). 51
Since the passage of the 1985 NCP, however, federal courts have
not required a private party to obtain prior approval of a party's
cleanup plan from EPA.52 EPA supports these judicial positions.
achieved 'substantial compliance' with the potentially applicable requirements,
and resulted in a CERCLA-quality cleanup." 55 Fed. Reg. 8793 (1990).
45. See NL Industries, 792 F.2d at 898-99. In NL Industries, the Ninth Circuit
held that in a private party action, consistency with the NCP does not necessitate
strict compliance. Id. The Channel Master court interpreted the Ninth Circuit's
holding as a conclusion that the reporting requirement was no longer applicable
to private party recovery actions, nor should it be required. Channel Master, 748 F.
Supp. at 384-85.
46. 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
47. Id. at 891. The Wickland court interpreted CERCLA § 107(a) as arguably
not requiring strict compliance with the NCP. Id. In Wickland, defendants chal-
lenged plaintiffs' cleanup action as being inconsistent with the NCP because plain-
tiffs had failed to obtain prior governmental approval. Id.
48. 792 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
49. Id. at 991 (quoting Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc. 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1254 n.27
(M.D. Pa. 1991)). The National Contingency Plan is set forth at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.
50. O'Neill v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 729 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 176
(1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
51. See Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del.
1987) (holding that NCP requires governmental approval of remedial actions
taken by private parties pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B)), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643
(3d Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 2032 (July 26, 1988); Bulk Distribution
Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1446-48 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (same).
52. See e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding authorized governmental cleanup program not required to pursue
claim for damages under CERCLA § 107(a)); Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v.
Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding significant state or
10
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For example, in the preamble to the final rule revising the
1985 NCP, EPA stated that the final rule "makes it absolutely clear
that no Federal approval of any kind is a prerequisite to a cost re-
covery action under section 107."15 Further, there is no procedure
"whereby a private party could seek to obtain prior governmental
approval of a cleanup program."5 4 Moreover, by not requiring pri-
vate parties to seek governmental approval of a cleanup plan, courts
effectuate CERCLA's broad remedial purpose: to promote "the ef-
fectiveness of private enforcement actions under section 107(a) as
a remedy independent of governmental actions financed by
Superfund."55
2. Public Recoveiy under CERCLA
CERCLA also authorizes a public party to recover response
costs expended in a cleanup action. 56 In United States v. Hardage,
57
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
consistency with the NCP is determined by reviewing the actions of
the party seeking response costs. 58 In a public party recovery ac-
tion, defendants are liable for "all" costs of removal or remedial
local governmental action not prerequisite for private party's response action to be
"necessary" or "consistent" with NCP); Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (holding EPA supervision of
private party's cleanup action not required for action under CERCLA).
53. 50 Fed. Reg. 47912, 47934 (1985). In the preamble, EPA also recognized
"'the widespread confusion and conflicting judicial interpretations of the issue' of
what consistency with the national contingency plan requires in private actions
under [CERCLA] section 107(a)." Id. In Wickland, the Eighth Circuit interpreted
this statement to mean that EPA did not require parties seeking recovery response
actions under § 107(a) to acquire "lead agency" approval of a cleanup program.
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986). The court
justified its decision on the basis that EPA had emphasized in its preamble to the
final rule that the revisions to the 1982 NCP were included to clarify, rather than
change, the preexisting requirements of the national contingency plan. Id.
54. Wickland, 792 F.2d at 892.
55. Id.
56. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). See supra note 38
for pertinent text of § 107(a) (4) (B). See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985) (discerning Congress did not intend to leave clean-
up responsibility under CERCLA solely to the federal government); Colorado v.
Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (D. Colo. 1989) (noting that "[1]ike
the USEPA, states can sue responsible parties to recover remedial and removal
costs."), judgment amended in part by 735 F. Supp. 368 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 916 F.2d
1486 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1991).
57. 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993).
58. Id. at 1442. The Hardage court reasoned that Congress intended that the
cleanup conduct of EPA be judged solely on the "not inconsistent" standard set
forth in CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A). Id.
19961
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action incurred in a manner "not inconsistent" with the NCP.59 All
costs incurred by the government in cleanup actions in a manner
"not inconsistent" with the NCP are conclusively determined to be
reasonable. 60
Once it is established that the party seeking response costs is a
public party,61 the potentially responsible parties bear the burden
of proving that the government's response actions are inconsistent
with the NCP.6 2 This burden of proof is difficult to meet because,
unlike private parties who undertake cleanup action, a government
agency enjoys a presumption of consistency with the NCP when it
seeks recovery of response costs. 63 This presumption does not ap-
59. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4) (A). See supra note 20
for statutory text of § 107(a) (4) (A).
60. See United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 1991 WL 333694 (W.D. Pa.
1991). The United States Supreme Court has stated that administrative agencies
are entitled to a presumption "that they will act properly and according to law."
Federal Communications Comm'n v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 296 (1965). See also
Red Top Mercury Mines, Inc. v. United States, 887 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1989) (dis-
cussing presumption that government officials execute their duties in regular fash-
ion); United States v. Garren, 893 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussingjudicial
presumption favoring validity of administrative action).
61. A public party recovery action exists when the federal government is seek-
ing recovery of response costs. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987). Cf New York v. General Electric Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 303-04 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) (applying same principle as concluded in Northeastern Pharmaceutical to ac-
tions when state government is seeking recovery of response costs).
62. See e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1508 (6th Cir.
1989) (requiring defendant bear burden of proving plaintiff's actions inconsistent
with NCP), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 747 (conclud-
ing statutory scheme of CERCLA supports placing burden of proving inconsistency
of governmental actions on defendant when government is party seeking recovery
of response costs); O'Neill v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 728 (D.R.I. 1988) (holding
that when state government is seeking recovery of response costs, defendants have
burden of proving government's actions inconsistent with NCP), aff'd, 883 F.2d
176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United States v. Ward, 618 F.
Supp. 884, 899 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (noting that while defendants entitled to chal-
lenge consistency of government's action with NCP, burden of proving inconsis-
tency placed on defendants); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 186 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding burden of proving response costs in-
curred by government "not inconsistent" with NCP rests with defendants); New
York v. General Electric Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
In Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., the court noted that the structure of CER-
CLA manifests a "differential willingness to indulge a presumption that response
action costs [incurred by the government] are recoverable." 455 F. Supp. 469, 472
(D. Mass. 1991). Further, the court explained that "[flor those actions undertaken
by entities cloaked with sovereignty, the burden is shifted to the defendants to
avoid assessment; for those actions undertaken by entities without the attributes of
sovereignty, the burden remains upon them to establish entitlement." Id.
63. United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992). In United
States v. Ward, the court noted that it would be "an unreasonable waste of judicial
time and government resources not to mention an usurpation of agency authority,
12
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ply, however, when the government agency does not take part in
the cleanup action.64
a. Prior governmental approval not required for a state to seek
recovery of response costs
States, unlike private parties, generally need not obtain prior
approval from EPA or the federal government to clean up hazard-
ous wastes in a manner "not inconsistent" with the NCP and seek
recovery of response costs from the potentially responsible par-
ties.65 In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,66 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that states do not need to act in
collaboration with the federal government in cleanup actions. 67
The Second Circuit reasoned that Congress envisioned that states
would use their own resources in cleanup actions, and consequently
seek recovery of their costs pursuant to CERCLA section
107(a) (4) (A). 68
to require the EPA to justify its every action in order to recover under section 107,
even when no allegation of inconsistency had been made." 618 F. Supp. 884, 900
(E.D.N.C. 1985).
64. United States v. Miami Drum Servs., Inc., 1986 WL 15327 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
See also Channel Master Satellite v. JFD Elec. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373, 391-93
(E.D.N.C. 1990). The court in Channel Master held that state officials were not in-
volved in the selection of cleanup alternatives. Id. at 393. As a result of this, no
private party-state negotiations had taken place, no consent decree mandating
compliance with NCP was formed, nor were there any state approvals in private
party's extensive compliance with NCP either before or after response actions. Id.
This situation was not one where "approval of the cleanup by state regulatory offi-
cials is itself indicative of NCP consistency." Id.
65. United States v. Gurley Refining Co., 788 F. Supp. 1473 (E.D. Ark. 1992),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part by 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 73
(1995) (finding no requirement for state to enter into contract or cooperative
agreement with federal government in order to bring recovery action pursuant to
CERCLA § 107(a), nor is failure to enter into contract or agreement indication
that response actions are "arbitrary and capricious"). See also United States v.
Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 421 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding no statutory procedural pre-
requisites to CERCLA § 107 action); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619
F. Supp. 162, 208 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stating "a cooperative agreement is not
mandatory"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co. 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (D.
Minn. 1982) (stating that "[w]hether there should be a cooperative agreement
between the President and Minnesota as provided by section 104(c) (3) is not ma-
terial in determining Reilly Tar's potential liability under section 107(a)"). While
prior approval by EPA of a state's response actions is "strong evidence" of consis-
tency with the NCP, "it is not the only fashion in which such consistency could be
demonstrated." City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 617 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
66. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 1047.
68. Id. The Shore court also noted that the NCP acknowledges a state's role in
compelling "potentially responsible parties" to independently undertake cleanup
1996] 413
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The Second Circuit's persuasive reasoning on the issue of
whether states must obtain prior governmental authorization in or-
der to undertake a cleanup action has been widely accepted by sev-
eral district courts. For example, in State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff69
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
held that the state of Ohio could maintain a lawsuit for recovery of
response costs pursuant to CERCLA section 107 without first ob-
taining Superfund authority under CERCLA section 104.70 Simi-
larly, in United States v. Wade,71 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that states do not need
EPA authorization to clean up hazardous waste sites and recover
from potentially responsible parties. 72 Further, the Wade court rea-
soned that such a reading of CERCLA would enable governments
to undertake emergency measures with the assurance that a cost
recovery action could be brought before completion of the clean-
up process. 73
b. "Arbitrary and capricious" government cleanup actions
Federal circuit courts agree that in order to establish that the
government's response actions are inconsistent with the NCP, a
party must prove the government's actions reach the level of being
actions. Id. at 1048. See supra note 20 for statutory text of CERCIA section
107(a) (4) (A).
69. 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
70. Id. at 1315. Defendants argued that while § 104 and § 107 are designed to
work "in tandem," the provisions should be construed as "coterminous." Id. at
1311 n.14. Dismissing this argument as unfounded, the Georgeoff court reasoned
that "[i]t is both logically possible and a more proper reading of the statute to
suggest that there are clean up operations which the state is authorized to perform
for which it may not recover in a § 9607 lawsuit." Id.
71. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
72. Id. at 1335-36. Defendants argued that while CERCLA § 104 limits ex-
penses from Superfund, § 107 likewise limits their liability. Id. Further, defend-
ants argued that even if § 107 would allow recovery of future response costs, the
government was nevertheless impeded from expending any more money at the
cleanup site. Id. The Wade court rejected this reasoning by stating that "[tihe
clear language of § 107 negates any such interdependence of the two sections [104
and 107]." Id. at 1336. Moreover, "the fact that the government expenditures at
the Wade site are not authorized by § 104 affects only the availability of Superfund
money, and not the generator defendants' liability." Id.
73. Id. at 1335. See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (noting Congress, in enacting CERCLA, in-
tended for federal government to be able to immediately respond to "problems of
national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal").
14
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"arbitrary and capricious." 74 Generally, federal courts have inter-
preted the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to be deferential. 75
For example, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm
Mutual Insurance,76 the United States Supreme Court, in clarifying
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, stated that it would "up-
hold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may
reasonably be discerned." 77 The Supreme Court concluded that
74. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1508 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
748 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)). See also Matter of Bell Petro-
leum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 907 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding EPA's decision to
construct alternative water supply system was arbitrary and capricious, thereby de-
nying EPA recovery of response costs). The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is
the standard regularly applied to a study of an agency's actions. Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). For a discussion of other
federal circuit courts applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard in determin-
ing consistency of government response actions with NCP, see infra notes 75-89
and accompanying text.
40 C.F.R. § 300.68 provides the government with a list of factors to consider in
its determination of which is the most appropriate remedial action. The language
of § 300.68(e) (2), in pertinent part, provides:
The following shall, as appropriate, be assessed in determining whether
and what type of remedial and/or removal actions will be considered:
(i) Population, environmental, and welfare concerns at risk;
(ii) Routes of exposure;
(iii) Amount, concentration, hazardous properties, environmental fate
and transport; ...
(vii) The extent to which the source can be adequately identified and
characterized; ...
(x) The extent to which natural or man-made barriers currently contain
the substances and the adequacy of the barriers; ...
(xii) The extent to which Federal environmental and public health re-
quirements are applicable or relevant and appropriate to the specific site,
and the extent to which other Federal criteria, advisories, and guidance
and State standards are to be considered in developing the remedy;
(xiii) The extent to which contamination levels exceed applicable or rele-
vant and appropriate Federal requirements or other Federal criteria, ad-
visories, and guidance and State standards; ...
(xvi) For Fund-financed responses, the availability of other appropriate
Federal or State response and enforcement mechanisms to respond to
the release; and
(xvii) Other appropriate matters may be considered.
40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e) (2) (1989).
75. In ELFAtochem North America v. United States, 882 F. Supp. 1499, 1502 (E.D.
Pa. 1995), the court acknowledged that its judicial evaluation of whether EPA's
Record of Decision was the outcome of an arbitrary and capricious action would
be "highly deferential, especially when we consider highly technical issues that the
EPA deals with daily." 882 F. Supp. 1499, 1502 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
76. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
77. Id. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys. Inc.,
419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)). Insurance companies petitioned the Supreme Court
for review of an order promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA) which revoked certain crash protection standards from the fed-
1996]
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courts should not furnish a reason for an agency's action; the
agency should, however, inspect all pertinent data and "articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connec-
tion between the facts found and the choice made.' ",78 Addition-
ally, in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 7 9
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit justified
this legal standard "because determining the appropriate removal
and remedial action involves specialized knowledge and expertise,
[and thus] the choice of a particular cleanup method is a matter
within the discretion of the [government]."80 Moreover, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas de-
termined that a court, reviewing the administrative record under
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, should not substitute its
own judgment for that of government officials responsible for the
cleanup action.81
eral motor vehicle safety requirements. Id. at 46. The Supreme Court held that the
agency's action in rescinding the crash protection requirements was "arbitrary and
capricious" for several reasons. Id. First, the Court found that the NHTSA seem-
ingly did not consider the issue of modifying the motor vehicle safety Standard 208
to require that airbags be used. Id. Second, the Court concluded that the agency
did not provide an adequate justification for its decision to revoke the passive re-
straint requirement. Id. at 48. Third, the Court determined that the agency had
to further contemplate the issue or "adhere to or amend Standard 208 along lines
which its analysis supports." Id. at 34.
78. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
167 (1962)). The Court further explained that, in reviewing an agency's action, a
court should look to see if the agency's decision "was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Id.
(quoting Bowman, 419 U.S. at 285). Considering the facts before it, the Court con-
cluded "[t]here are no findings and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no
indication of the basis on which the [agency] exercised its expert discretion." Id.
at 48. (quoting Burlington, 371 U.S. at 167). Therefore, the Court declared,
"[e]xpert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but 'unless we
make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise,
the strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules with no
practical limits on its discretion.'" Id. (citing New York v. United States, 342 U.S.
882, 884 (1952) (dissenting opinion)) (footnote ommitted).
79. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
80. Id. at 748.
81. United States v. Gurley Refining Co., 788 F. Supp. 1473, 1481 (E.D. Ark.
1992), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
73 (1995). Rather, in reviewing the administrative record, the court should search
"for glaring omissions or mistakes which indicate that [the party which has in-
curred the response costs] has acted arbitrarily and capriciously." Id. (quoting
United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1424-25 (6th Cir.
1991)). The Akzo court determined that "the manner in which the site was evalu-
ated and ranked cannot be used as an example of arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion .... " Akzo, 949 F.2d at 1424-25. Cf Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) (stating "[iln all cases agency action must be
set aside if the action was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law' or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or
16
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Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, to deny a gov-
ernment party recovery of its response costs, the reviewing court
must determine that the government's choice of response actions,
rather than costs, is arbitrary and capricious.82 However, whether a
cleanup action is arbitrary and capricious is linked to the issue of
cost.83 For example, in United States v. Hardage,84 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant "must
show that the government acted arbitrarily and capriciously in fail-
ing to consider cost, or in selecting a remedial alternative that is not
cost-effective." 85 Similarly, in United States v. R.W Meyer, Inc.,86 the
constitutional requirements.") (citation omitted). But see Matter of Bell Petroleum
Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 905 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that while court should not
substitute its own judgment for that of agency, "[jiudicial review 'must be based on
something more than trust and faith in EPA's experience.'") (quoting American
Petroleum Inst. v. E.P.A., 661 F.2d 340, 349 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Appalachian
Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1365 (4th Cir. 1976))).
Some courts have looked outside of the administrative record in determining
whether an agency has acted in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner for the pur-
pose of obtaining a better understanding of the subject area at issue. ELF
Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 882 F. Supp. 1499, 1502-03 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
See also County of Bergen v. Dole, 620 F. Supp. 1009, 1059 (D.N.J. 1985) (allowing
plaintiffs to submit expert reports to illustrate that defendant's actions were arbi-
trary and capricious), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1986). Courts which choose to
look at outside evidence should be careful to consider it only to determine
whether there is anything in the administrative record to sustain the agency's deci-
sion, rather than to ascertain whether the agency's decision was right or wrong.
ELFAtochem, 882 F. Supp. at 1503.
82. United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1995) (emphasis added). "The NCP regulates choice of response
actions, not costs." Id. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.65, 300.68 (1989) (emphasis added).
This requirement is advanced by the concept that "[c]osts, by themselves, cannot
be inconsistent with the NCP. Only response actions. . . can be inconsistent with
the NCP, which can be demonstrated by a showing that the government's choice
of response action was arbitrary and capricious." Hardage, 982 F.2d at 1443 (em-
phasis added).
83. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 748 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
84. 982 F.2d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1995).
85. Id. According to the Hardage court, however, the fact that an individual
cost is unreasonable or excessive does not establish inconsistency with the NCP.
Id. It should be noted that the Hardage case reached the Second Circuit on an
appeal of a grant of partial summaryjudgment and declaratory judgment in favor
of the government for recovery of its response costs. Id. at 1438-39.
For an alternative to be "cost-effective," it must be "the lowest cost alternative
that is technologically feasible and reliable and which "effectively mitigates and
minimizes damage to and provides adequate protection of public health and wel-
fare, and the environment." 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i) (1) (1989). "[W]hether costs are
'necessary' or 'cost-effective' are relevant only to the extent that the NCP imposes
those requirements." United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 1991 WL 333694
(W.D. Pa. 1991) (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 748 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)).
86. 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989).
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court determined that EPA's decision to forgo competitive bidding
in organizing its response efforts was not an "arbitrary and capri-
cious" action. 87 In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned
that simply because a cleanup action can take place within six
months of the identification of the environmental hazard rather
than immediately, does not mean that the possible danger from the
release of the hazardous material is insignificant. 88 Rather, the
court stated that the government "must organize its response efforts
in accordance with the severity of the danger posed."8 9
D. Recovery of Attorney's Fees under CERCLA
Generally, attorney's fees are not awarded to the prevailing liti-
gating party absent explicit statutory authorization or provision for
them in a contract between the disputing parties. 90 In Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,91 the United States Supreme
Court concluded that only Congress could authorize an exception
to the "American Rule."92 In its 1994 decision, Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States,93 the Supreme Court held that in a private party cost
recovery action, attorney's fees incurred for litigation costs under
CERCLA are non-recoverable. 94 Moreover, the Supreme Court de-
termined that an explicit legislative directive is necessary for private
parties to recover attorney's fees incurred in the litigation of their
87. Id. 889 F.2d at 1508. To successfully establish EPA response costs as in-
consistent with the NCP, defendant Meyer had to establish that the "EPA's decision
to incur the challenged costs was 'arbitrary and capricious.'" Id. (emphasis ad-
ded) (citation ommitted).
88. Id. at 1508.
89. Id.
90. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
The general bar to parties recovering attorney's fees incurred during litigation has
been dubbed the "American Rule." Id.
91. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
92. Id. at 247.
93. 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
94. Id. at 1966. The Key Tronic court denied the award of attorney's fees for
three reasons. Id. First, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the private
party's response action under CERCLA is through implication rather than an ex-
press provision, it would be "unusual if not unprecedented" for the explicitness
required by Alyeska to be fulfilled. Id. at 1966-67. Second, Congress indicated its
intent not to allow recovery of attorney's fees by failing to expressly provide for
them in § 107, yet providing recovery in two other sections: § 310(f) and
§ 106(b)(2)(E). Id. at 1967. Third, to award attorney's fees in private party re-
sponse actions would extend the plain meaning of the phrase "enforcement activi-
ties." Id. For a thorough analysis of the Key Tronic decision, see Albertina D.
Susco, "Key Tronic Corporation v. United States: Recovery of Attorney's Fees in Private Cost-
Recovery Actions Under CERCLA," 6 ViL. E,'vrL. L.J. 405 (1995).
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response recovery claim.9 5 The Supreme Court did, nonetheless,
conclude that a private party may recover nonlitigation fees.9 6 The
Key Tronic Court, did not, however, determine whether a govern-
ment party may recover attorney's fees incurred in the litigation of
a recovery response action.97
III. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA TION EV
WASHINGTON NA TURAL GAS Co.
A. Facts
In 1982, WSDOT undertook construction of the Tacoma Spur,
an interstate highway project.98 In late 1983 and 1984, Hart
Crowser, WSDOT's geotechnical consulting firm, discovered a tar-
like substance in the material that would support the planned high-
way structures. 99
In July 1984, Hart Crowser began investigating the nature and
extent of the construction site's subsurface contamination.100 Hart
Crowser first examined historical records, and discovered that the
site had been previously used as a coal gasification plant for several
years.10' At the time of the investigation, the coal gasification plant
as well as the gas holders used to store the manufactured gas were
no longer visible, and were presumed to have been removed.102
Hart Crowser further assumed that tar, a likely by-product of the
95. Id. at 1965. See also Mullins, supra note 42, at 1515 (stating that Key Tronic
revised boundaries of American Rule).
96. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967. See also Mullins, supra note 41, at 1515. In
order for a private party to recover attorney's fees, three qualifications must be
met. First, the fees must be for nonlitigation purposes. Id. Second, "the work
performed must significantly benefit the cleanup." Id. at 1516. Third, the costs
must have been incurred "separate [ly] and distinct[ly] from reallocation of costs
or protection of the private party's interest as a defendant." Id.
97. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966-67. Rather, the Supreme Court noted that
generally, judicial decisions, rather than statutory text, had interpreted the origi-
nal CERCLA version to include attorney's fees. Id. at 1966. Key Tronic argued
that a private action under CERCILA § 107 is an "enforcement activity" covered by
the statute, and therefore, attorney's fees should be available in private as well as
government actions. Id.
98. Washington State Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co.
(WSD07), 59 F.3d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1995)
99. Id.
100. Id. at 797.
101. Id. A coal gasification plant had operated on the construction site from
1884 through 1924. Id. Hart Crowser used Sanborn maps to determine the loca-
tions of gas holders which had been utilized to store the manufactured gas. Id.
102. Id.
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coal gasification process, had been removed for its commercial
value. 10 3
Upon the first discovery of the tar-like material, WSDOT re-
ported the contamination to the Washington State Department of
Ecology (WSDOE). 10 4 WSDOE tested soil samples taken from the
construction site using the "persistence testing method," which tests
for the total level of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) com-
pounds. 0 5 WSDOE found the level of PAH compounds to be suffi-
ciently high to consider the tar-like material to be "extremely
hazardous waste." 10 6 As a result of its tests, WSDOE recommended
that WSDOT have the contaminated construction site placed on
the National Priority List, an option which WSDOT declined. 10 7
Hart Crowser also performed a test on soil samples taken from
the contaminated construction site.'08 From these samples, Hart
Crowser discovered two different types of contaminated substance:
the tar-like material and oily silt and sand. 109 Unlike WSDOE's
tests, Hart Crowser determined that the PAH level in the samples of
the tar-like material was less than one percent.110 Also unlike
WSDOE's tests, Hart Crowser did not test for the total PAH level in
103. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 797. Further, Hart Crowser assumed that "any re-
maining tar waste had been dumped on the extremities of the plant grounds." Id.
104. Id. at 796.
105. Id. at 797.
106. Id. WSDOE found that the tar contained a concentration of polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) of greater than one percent. Id. Under WSDOE
regulations, PAH concentrations in excess of one percent are deemed extremely
hazardous. Id. " 'PAH's', or polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons, are a large class
of chemical compounds." Appellant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 4, Wash-
ington State Dep't of Transp., 59 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1995) (Nos. 93-35088, 93-
35130, 93-35137, 93-35289, 93-35292, 93-35330) (hereinafter "Appellant's Petition").
WSDOE's project engineer, Megan White, testified at trial that it did not matter
whether or not the PAH level of concentration was less than one percent; the
material was "still highly contaminated and could not remain on the site." Id. at 5.
In its petition for rehearing en banc, WSDOT cited to United States v. Union
Gas Co., a decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
which held a site contaminated with coal tar constituents, some of which were the
same as found at the WSDOT site, to be contaminated with a "hazardous sub-
stance" under CERCLA. Appellant's Petition at 6. See United States v. Union Gas
Co., 586 F. Supp. 1522, 1525 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
107. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 797. Placement of the site on the National Priority
List (NPL) would enable WSDOT to obtain funding for the cleanup action pursu-
ant to the Superfund program. Id. Hart Crowser declined to pursue the option,
rationalizing that WSDOT thought it would take too much time and effort. Id.
108. Id. The Hart Crowser firm obtained 359 soil samples from 26 soil bor-
ings which were not placed in the area where the gas holders were thought to have
been located during the time of the operation of coal gasification plant. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Rather, the highest concentration of contamination tested by Hart
Crowser of the tar-like material was found to be only .5 percent, with the second
20
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the contaminated material.111 Rather, relying on WSDOE's origi-
nal tests, Hart Crowser decided that the tar-like material would be
categorized as hazardous waste by WSDOE standards. 11 2 Subse-
quently, in November 1984, Hart Crowser issued a report of its find-
ings concerning the volume of the subsurface contamination."1
While Hart Crowser investigated the contaminated material
found at the construction site, WSDOT formed an interagency
team to determine the appropriate course of action. 114 The team
decided that both the tar-like material and the oily silt and sand
must be removed due to the varying amounts of contamination.' 5
With regard to the tar-like material, the team concluded that the
only feasible alternative was disposal at a hazardous waste facility."16
After much deliberation, the team decided to place the oily silt and
sand in vaults on the construction site.'1 7
In December 1985, the remains of a large gas holder filled with
a mixture of tar and other material was discovered at the construc-
tion site.'1 8 Again, in February 1986, WSDOT's construction con-
tractor uncovered an even larger gas holder, which was filled with
tar and other material, in addition to a small pit filled with tar.119
Subsequently, WSDOT stopped construction of the highway.' 20 By
October 1986, WSDOT had substantially completed its cleanup of
highest level only reaching .15 percent. Id. Further, tests revealed that the level of
contamination in the oily silt and sand reached only .02 percent. Id.
111. Id.
112. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 797.
113. Id. The volume of contamination was determined by interpolating be-
tween the soil borings. Id. It was estimated that the construction site contained a
maximum of 100 tons of coal tar and a maximum of 10,000 tons of oily silt and
sand. Id.
114. Id. The interagency team consisted of representatives of Hart Crowser,
WSDOE, WSDOT, and at various times, representatives of the Federal Highway
Administration and the Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department. Id.
115. Id. WSDOT acknowledged that the characterization of each of the types
of materials would affect the remedy chosen, and consequently, the cost of re-
moval. Id.
116. Id. The hazardous waste facility was located in Arlington, Oregon. Id. at
798.
117. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 798. The placement of the oily silt and sand in vaults
on the construction site was a less expensive option than disposal at a hazardous
waste facility. Id. The team also considered on-site disposal, chemical treatment,
and disposal of the oily silt and sand at a landfill. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. Using the persistence testing method utilized by WSDOE in its origi-
nal tests on the construction site, Hart Crowser discovered that "samples taken
from the tar pit area contained a PAH level of greater than one percent." Id. Tests
indicated that samples taken from the second larger gas holder contained a PAH
level of less than one percent. Id.
120. Id. at 798.
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the construction site, shipping 15,900 tons of coal tar to a landfill,
and placing 26,450 tons of oily silt and sand in concrete vaults lo-
cated at the construction site.1 21 WSDOT incurred response costs
totaling more than $4,550,000.122
B. Procedural History
On August 4, 1989, WSDOT filed an action against, inter alia,
Washington Natural Gas Company, (WNG),12s to recover its re-
sponse costs under section 107 of CERCLA. 124  Additionally,
WSDOT filed three motions for partial summary judgment.1 2 5 Ac-
cordingly, WNG filed a joint motion for partial summary
judgment. 126
The District Court for the Western District of Washington
found that WSDOT was not a "State" within the meaning of CER-
CLA, thereby denying WSDOT the presumption of consistency of
its actions with the National Contingency Plan (NCP)*127
121. Id.
122. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 798. "Handling and disposal of the tar cost
$4,000,000, while handling and containment of the oily silt and sand cost
$550,000." Id.
123. Id. In addition, Pacificorp was named as a defendant. Id. at 793. Ad-
vance Ross Corporation was named as a third party defendant. Id.
124. Id. at 798. For a discussion of the applicable defenses to liability under
CERCLA § 107, see Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d
691, 695 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting "the question whether a response action is neces-
sary and consistent with the criteria set forth in the contingency plan is a factual
one to be determined at the damages stage of a section 107(a) action .. ").
125. Id. at 798. The district court found that each defendant was a responsi-
ble "person" under CERCLA § 107. Id. Further, the district court determined that
the defendants did not state a "valid reason" to deny summaryjudgment in favor of
WSDOT on the issue of liability, since the defendants challenged liability only on
the basis that WSDOT "had failed to comply with the NCP." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 798. The National Contingency Plan is printed in 40 C.F.R. pt. 300
(1986). The general outline for the NCP is set forth at CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605. See supra note 7 for textual language of CERCLA § 105.
The district court rejected WSDOT's contention that its consultation with
WSDOE, a state agency with expertise in environmental cleanup matters, created a
presumption of consistency with the NCP applicable to WSDOT's cleanup actions
at the site. Order on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Washington State
Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1995) (C89-
415TC) (hereinafter "Order"). Rather, the court agreed with the reasoning that
"any presumption of regularity or correctness which the United States [EPA] en-
joys [under CERCLA] may not automatically be imputed to those third parties who
perform cleanups on its behalf." Id. (citing United States v. Miami Drum Servs.,
Inc., 1986 WL 15327, at *11 (S.D. Fla. 1986)); City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co.,
713 F. Supp. 1484, 1490 (E.D. Pa. 1989)). See also Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.,
707 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (D. Colo. 1989) (determining that state agency must first
establish threshold of expertise in order to enjoy presumption of consistency with
NCP).
22
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The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the language of CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a) (4) (A) was not limited to only those "State" agencies
with special expertise. 128 However, the court held that WSDOT's
response actions were so inconsistent with the applicable NCP so as
to be "arbitrary and capricious," and thus, denied WSDOT recovery
of its response costs under CERCLA. 129
IV. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA TION V
WASHINGTON NA TURAL GAS CO.: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
ANALYSIS
In 1995, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
WSDOT was not entitled to recover its cleanup costs incurred at the
Tacoma Spur construction site because its actions were inconsistent
with the National Contingency Plan.130 The court reached this con-
clusion by first determining that WSDOT is a "State" within the
meaning of CERCLA. 131 Second, the court concluded that under
CERCLA section 107, a state is entitled to a presumption of consis-
tency with the applicable NCP.132 Third, the court determined that
WSDOT's actions were sufficiently inconsistent with the NCP to be
"arbitrary and capricious," and denied WSDOT recovery of its
cleanup costs.' 33 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
128. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 801. The court stated "[w]e cannot create such a
limitation where none is provided by the statute." Id. When a state seeks recovery
costs under CERCLA, consistency with the National Contingency Plan is presumed
even if the state agency, such as WSDOT, acts without first receiving authorization
from the federal government. Id. at 801. For a discussion of the determination
that states do not need to obtain authorization from EPA in order to clean up
hazardous waste sites and subsequently recover their costs from potentially respon-
sible parties, see supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 802-05. The Court justified its use of the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard stating that "because determining the appropriate removal and remedial
action involves specialized knowledge and expertise, the choice of a particular
cleanup method is a matter within the discretion of the [government]." Id. at 802
(quoting United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 748 (8th Cir. 1986)).
130. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 805 (9th Cir. 1995).
131. Id. at 800-01. For a discussion of what constitutes a "State" within the
meaning of CERCLA, see supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 801. For a discussion of the presumption of consistency with the
NCP afforded to governmental entities and its effect on public recovery actions
under CERCLA, see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 802-05. For a discussion of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
afforded to governmental entities concerning cleanup actions under CERCLA, see
supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
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trict court's denial of the defendant's attorney's fees incurred to
prove WSDOT's noncompliance with the NCP.1 34
A. WSDOT is a "State"
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the issue of whether
WSDOT is a "State" within the meaning of CERCLA by looking at
the plain language of the statute. 135 The Ninth Circuit noted that
the statutory definition of "State" does not provide guidance as to
what constitutes "the several States of the United States."13 6 Never-
theless, the court determined that it did not need a more detailed
explanation of what constitutes a "State" since "the plain meaning
of 'State' is the organized government acting on behalf of the citi-
zens of the state," which includes administrative departments and
agencies.13 7 Further, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its inter-
pretation of "State" is supported by the dictionary definition of
"State." 13 8
Next, the court emphasized that its discussion was limited to
whether the term "State," as used in CERCLA, encompasses a state-
wide agency such as WSDOT, which is part of the organized govern-
ment of the state itself.139 In doing so, the court dismissed as irrele-
vant those judicial decisions which concluded that the definition of
"State" does not include political subdivisions such as municipali-
134. Id. at 805-06. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's denial of attorney's
fees, see infra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
135. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 800. See Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic Rich-
field Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The plain language of a statute is
the starting point for its interpretation.") (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patter-
son, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982)). See also S & M Inv. Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 326 (9th Cir. 1990) ("When construing a statute, we look
first to the plain meaning of the language in question."); United States v. Taylor,
802 F.2d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding court's objective in interpreting
statute is to discern Congress' intent and effectuate legislative will), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1094 (1987).
136. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 800. See supra note 27 for textual language of CER-
CLA § 101(27).
137. Id. at 800. The Ninth Circuit defined "state agency" as the following:
"[a] department, commission, board, committee, or body of any form operating as
an instrumentality of the state government." Id. (citing BALLANTINE's LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1210 (3d ed. 1969)). A state agency need not have cleanup expertise to
be considered a "State" for purposes of 107(a)(4)(A). Id. at 801.
138. Id. at 800. Black's Law Dictionary defines "State" as "[a] people perma-
nently occupying a fixed territory bound together by common-law habits and cus-
tom into one body politic exercising, through the medium of an organized government,
independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its bound-
anes .... " Id. (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1262 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis
added).
139. Id. The court noted that a municipality is a local government with au-
thority spanning only a limited area within a state. Id. at n.5.
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ties.140 The Ninth Circuit viewed a municipality as being different
than a state agency because, unlike a state agency, a municipality
only has authority over a limited geographical area.14 1
Finally, the court addressed WNG's contention that the term
"State" should be limited to only those state-agencies which are au-
thorized to undertake removal or remedial actions. 142 Dismissing
this position as groundless, the court noted that section
107(a) (4) (A) does not contain any requirement that a state must
receive prior authorization from the federal government before it
can undertake a response action.1 43 Rather, to adopt the defend-
ant's argument would essentially add another defense to liability to
those already enumerated under section 107(b). 14 Moreover, the
140. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 800.
141. Id. at 800 n.5. See also Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp.
469, 475 (D. Mass. 1991) ("The language and structure of CERCLA make clear
that a municipality is not a 'State' as defined in the statute."); City of Phila. v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating Congress' use
of the terms "municipalities," "local governments," and "political subdivisions" in
other sections of CERCILA "suggest[s] both that the omission of 'municipalities'
from the definition of 'state' was not accidental and that Congress had no inten-
tion of implicitly including municipalities within the word 'state'") (internal cita-
tions omitted). For a discussion of various court's interpretations of whether a
municipality or political subdivision is a "state" within meaning of CERCLA, see
supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
142. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 800-01. Defendants' argument was that WSDOT
should not be considered a "State" under § 107 because "WSDOT did not act pur-
suant to authorization obtained from the federal government, i.e., the EPA." Id.
CERCLA defines "removal" actions and "remedial" actions as being two distinct
measures. CERCLA §§ 101(23), (24), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23), (24). "Remedial"
measures are long-term or permanent measures. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 801 n.6. See
also CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). "Removal" measures are essentially
short-term measures. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 801 n.6. See also CERCIA § 101 (23), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23).
143. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 801. The court stated that CERCLA section 107(a)
does not contain an approval or certification requirement, thus justifying the infer-
ence that private parties who do not seek reimbursement for their cleanup costs
from the Superfund are not required to obtain prior governmental approval in
order for "their response action to be 'necessary' or 'consistent' with the national
contingency plan." Id. (citing Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1988)).
144. Id. "Section 9607(a) (4) (A) expressly imposes liability on listed parties
'notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b).' The defendants' position, if adopted, would
require that we read the 'notwithstanding' clause out of the statute." Id.
CERCLA section 107(b) enumerates four defenses to liability imposed under§ 107(a). Section 107(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a per-
son otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
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court noted that other federal courts have held that states are not
required to receive EPA authorization prior to clean up of hazard-
ous wastes in order to recover from potentially responsible
parties.14 5
B. The Presumption of Consistency
Determining that WSDOT is a "State" within the meaning of
CERCLA, the Ninth Circuit next addressed the issue of whether the
district court's incorrect finding of WSDOT as a "person" rather
than a "State" under CERCLA, and the resulting misapplication of
the burden of proof, was dispositive of the outcome of the case.1 46
Since WSDOT is a "State," the Ninth Circuit concluded that WNG
"should have borne the burden of proving that WSDOT's actions
were inconsistent with the NCP." 147 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the district court's decision that WSDOT acted inconsis-
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a
published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail),
if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a)
he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance con-
cerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous
substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could forseeably result from such acts or omis-
sions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
145. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 801. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1047 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting appellants' argument that states cannot act on
their own and seek recovery under CERCLA); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that restrictions contained in § 104 intended to
protect integrity of Superfund rather than to limit government's replenishment of
it by recovery of response costs from responsible parties); State ex rel. Brown v.
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (concluding that state of
Ohio need not have to enter into prior agreement with federal government under
§ 104 in order to maintain lawsuit under § 107); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982) (stating it is immaterial for
purposes of determining defendant's potential liability under § 107(a) whether
state of Minnesota and President of United States had entered into cooperative
agreement under § 104(c) (3)).
146. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 801. By finding WSDOT to be a "person," rather
than a "state" within the meaning of CERCLA, the district court forced WSDOT to
proceed pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B). Id. Consequently, at trial, WSDOT
did not enjoy a presumption of consistency, and had the burden of proving that its
cleanup actions were incurred in a manner "consistent" with the NCP. Id. The
district court had determined that CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A) required a party like
WSDOT to have cleanup expertise to be entitled to a presumption of consistency.
Id.
147. Id.
[Vol. VII: p. 401
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tently with the NCP was supported by ample evidence, and
therefore, the district court's mistake was harmless error. 148
C. WSDOT's Arbitrary and Capricious Actions
Once the court established that WSDOT was a "State" entitled
to a presumption of consistency with the NCP, it then proceeded to
determine that WSDOT's actions in cleanup of the site were so "ar-
bitrary and capricious" as to deny WSDOT its response costs.1 49
First, the court determined which version of the NCP was applica-
ble. 150 Second, the court reviewed WSDOT's actions for compli-
ance with the NCP.1 51
1. Applicable Version of NCP
Reasoning that the court should look to the NCP in effect
when WSDOT incurred its cleanup costs, rather than the version in
effect when WSDOT began its response actions, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington correctly applied the 1985 version of the NCP to ninety-five
percent of WSDOT's costs. 1 52 Further, the court declined to con-
148. Id. "[W]e conclude it is clear that under the proper assignment of the
burden of proof, the district court would have reached the same decision." Id.
(citing Applewood Landscape & Nursery Co. v. Hollingsworth, 884 F.2d 1502, 1506
(1st Cir. 1989)) (concluding that without indication that trial court's decision at
end of trial turned on "burden of proof" rules rather than on weight of evidence,
if description of burden of production is misstatement of law, it is harmless error).
See also Smith v. United States, 590 F.2d 304, 305 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding trial
court's allocation of burden of proof upon appellant "harmless error" when evi-
dence introduced by government overwhelming to result that plaintiff had no
claim for money confiscated by government).
149. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 802. "Even under the deferential arbitrary and capri-
cious standard, we conclude that WSDOT's actions were inconsistent with the
NCP." Id.
150. Id. "Before we review WSDOT's actions, we must determine which ver-
sion of the NCP applies." Id. See infra notes 152-153 and accompanying text for
Ninth Circuit's determination of applicable NCP.
151. Id. at 803-05. "We... review WSDOT's action for compliance with the
NCP, to determine whether WSDOT's actions were arbitrary and capricious." Id.
at 803. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text for Ninth Circuit's determi-
nation of whether WSDOT's cleanup actions reached such a level of inconsistency
with NCP to be considered "arbitrary and capricious."
152. Id. at 802. The 1985 NCP was published in the Federal Register on No-
vember 20, 1985. Id. In addition, "guidance documents" on the 1985 NCP were
also available before November. Id. WSDOT did not dispute that "it incurred over
ninety-five percent of its response costs after November 20, 1985." Id. Conse-
quently, in the Ninth Circuit's view, the 1985 NCP was the applicable NCP "for all
practical purposes." Id. See generally NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898
(9th Cir. 1986) (stating agreement with petitioner's argument that court should
look to contingency plan in effect at time that respondent allegedly incurred re-
sponse costs rather than plan in effect at time of trial); Wickland Oil Terminals v.
1996]
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sider which version of the NCP applied to the remaining five per-
cent of WSDOT's response costs, since the court considered
WSDOT's actions to be inconsistent under either version of the
NCP.153
2. Consistency with the NCP
Before evaluating whether WSDOT acted in a manner "not in-
consistent" with the 1985 NCP, the court first established that its
review of the district court's legal conclusion was de novo. 154 First,
the WSDOT court examined the requirements set forth in the 1985
NCP.155 The 1985 NCP requires a remedial investigation "to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the threat presented by the release,"156
an initial screening of alternative cleanup measures,1 57 and a public
notice and comment period.1 58
Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that WSDOT's environmental
consultant made several incorrect assumptions and miscalculations
concerning the amount and the extent of the threat posed by the
Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that before court could
address appellee's arguments, court needed to look to national contingency plan
in effect at time appellant allegedly incurred response costs).
153. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 802. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found the district
court's error in failing to apply the 1982 NCP to WSDOT's remaining five percent
of response costs to be harmless error. Id. at 802.
154.. Id. at 802 n.8. "The construction of a statute is a question of law that is
reviewable de novo." United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 754 F.2d 1445, 1447
(9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Wilson, 720 F.2d 608, 609 n.2 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984)). "In de novo review, the appellate court
must review the record in light of its own independent judgment without giving
special weight to the prior decision." United States v. Akzo Coatings of America,
949 F.2d 1409, 1423 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218,
220 (10th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, even though the district court had applied
§ 107(a) (4) (B) rather than § 107(a) (4) (A), and consequently the wrong legal
standard-"whether WSDOT had 'substantially complied' with the NCP[,]" the
Ninth Circuit found that it did not owe any deference to the district court's legal
conclusions. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 803.
155. Id. at 803.
156. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(d) (1986)). A remedial investigation is
also required for compliance with the 1982 NCP. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(f) (1984). A
remedial investigation includes "sampling, monitoring, as necessary, and includes
the gathering of sufficient information to determine the necessity for and pro-
posed extent of remedial action." 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(d) (1986).
157. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e) (1986). As required by the NCP, the party con-
ducting the cleanup must develop several alternative measures based on a number
of different factors including "population, environmental and welfare concerns at
risk; routes of exposure; amount, concentration, hazardous properties, environ-
mental fate and transport and form of the substances present; hydrogeological
factors; current and potential ground water use, climate, etc." 40 C.F.R
§§ 300.68(e) (2) (i) - (xvii) (f)(2) (1986); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e) (1)- (2), (g) (1984).
158. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68 (1986).
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tar-like material at the site. 159 In addition to underestimating the
level of tar-like material present at the site, Hart Crowser had con-
sidered much of the tar-like material to be hazardous waste even
though this classification was not supported by tests. 160 Finally,
WSDOT's remedial investigation failed to provide "sufficient infor-
mation to determine the necessity for and proposed extent of reme-
dial action."' 6 1
Next, the court asserted that WSDOT had failed to adequately
analyze alternative courses of action.1 6 2 While the interagency team
had informally considered several alternatives during its first investi-
gation of the site, the court concluded that, with respect to the tar-
like material, the record did not show that these alternatives had
been thoroughly analyzed to the extent required by the NCP. 163 In
addition, with respect to the oily silt and sand, the interagency team
had not considered the alternatives of reuse, on-site disposal, land-
fill disposal, disposal at Arlington, or treatment. 164 Finally, the
159. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 803. Hart Crowser assumed that the coal gasification
plant had been removed without considering "the possibility that only a portion of
the plant had been removed, while the rest, including the remainder of the gas
holders, had been filled in." Id. Additionally, the original estimate of 100 tons of
tar-like material needing to be excavated from the site increased to 16,000 tons
after lower sections of gas holders containing more tar-like material were discov-
ered. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 804. A party is required by the NCP to narrow its list of alternatives
by considering cost in addition to acceptable engineering practices and their effec-
tiveness. Id. In addition, the party's rationale for eliminating certain courses of
action must be documented. Id. at 803-04 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(g) (1986); 40
C.F.R. § 300.68(h) (1984)).
163. Id. at 804. After the initial screening of alternatives has been conducted,
"it]he NCP requires a much more detailed analysis of the remaining alternatives,
including detailed specification of alternatives, detailed cost estimation, engineer-
ing evaluation, assessment of the extent to which the alternative will adequately
protect public health and the environment, etc." Id. (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.68(h) (2) (i) - (vi) (1986); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68 (i)(2)(A) - (E) (1984)).
The court had several problems with respect to the interagency team's han-
dling of the tar-like material. First, Hart Crowser's report did not mention the
alternatives of in-situ treatment or incineration. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 804. Second,
the court noted that WSDOE's summary analysis stated that the disposal of the tar-
like material at Arlington was the sole "feasible option." Id. Moreover, the inter-
agency team's failure to reevaluate alternatives after the second discovery of tar-
like material at the site particularly incensed the Ninth Circuit. Id. "Once it be-
came clear that the initial assessment grossly underestimated the amount of tarry
material on the site, the team should have reconsidered the available alternatives. In-
stead, the team continued to rely on an analysis of alternatives designed to address
a much smaller problem." Id. (emphasis added).
164. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 804. "Although each alternative is discussed briefly
[in WSDOE's summary report] the interagency team did not follow the thorough
requirements set forth in the NCP." Id.
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court concluded that if WSDOT had complied with the require-
ments of the NCP, it would probably not have disposed of the un-
tested materials in the same manner as the tested materials.1 65
After establishing WSDOT's failure to determine the nature
and extent of the threat posed by the release of the contaminated
material and WSDOT's failure to adequately develop and analyze
alternative cleanup methods, the court subsequently determined
that WSDOT failed to provide the required adequate notice and
opportunity for public comment. 16 Recognizing that there was no
public comment provision in the 1982 NCP, the court reiterated
that the 1985 NCP, containing such a provision, applied to
WSDOT's actions. 167
D. Denial of Attorney's Fees
In denying recovery of attorney's fees to Washington Natural
Gas, Advance Ross Corporation, and Pacificorp, the court defined
the issue as whether "[WSDOT] acted reasonably in believing that it
might prevail" on the merits of its case at trial. 168 Accordingly, the
165. Id. at 804-05. WSDOT failed to consider "whether the varying concen-
trations warranted consideration of alternative disposal methods." Id. at 805.
166. Id. "WSDOT failed to provide an opportunity for public review and com-
ment of the alternative remedial measures it was considering." Id. (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.71(a) (2) (ii)(D) (1986)).
167. Id. The court explained that because WSDOT had discovered additional
tar-like material after the publication date of the 1985 NCP, WSDOT "should have
provided [an opportunity for] public comment after reevaluating the alternatives
available to it." Id.
168. Id. at 806. The Ninth Circuit stated that the district court had denied
attorney's fees pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 37(c) (1993). Id. at 805. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(c)(2), in pertinent part, provides:
If a party fails to admit the genuineness . . . of any matter requested
under Rule 36 [Requests for Admission], and if the party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the... truth of the mat-
ter, the requesting party may apply to the court for an order requiring
the other party to pay the party the reasonable expenses incurred in mak-
ing that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall
make the order unless it finds that... (B) the admission sought was of no
substantial importance, or (C) the party failing to admit had reasonable
ground to believe that the party might prevail on the matter.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c) (2) (1993) (emphasis added). Although the court determined
WSDOT failed to comply with either the 1982 or the 1985 NCP, it concluded that
attorney's fees could still be denied if WSDOT had "reasonable ground to believe
that [it] might prevail on the matter." WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 805.
Defendants requested three admissions of WSDOT: (1)that WSDOT had not
complied with portions of the NCP; (2) that "the presence or release of coal tar
and other wastes at the site did not pose an immediate and significant risk of harm
to human life, health, or the environment;" and (3) that WSDOT failed to develop
a community relations plan for its response actions. Id. at 805-06. Regarding the
second requested admission, the court deemed it to be of "no substantial impor-
tance" because the NCP does not mandate a demonstration of "immediate" risk.
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Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees
to the defendants.1 69
First, the court recognized that WSDOT followed the require-
ments set forth in the NCP and, as such, could have reasonably be-
lieved that it might have prevailed at trial.1 70 Lacking expertise in
environmental matters, WSDOT had consulted with WSDOE and a
private consultant to aid WSDOT in (1) testing the material; (2)
developing alternative remedial actions; and (3) ensuring that
WSDOT's cleanup action complied with the applicable environ-
mental law.1 7 1 Further, because WSDOT's first tests on the contam-
inated material revealed that it was an "extremely hazardous waste,"
WSDOT was reasonable in its belief that the tar-like material posed
a significant threat of harm.1 72 Additionally, it was unclear at the
time of trial whether WSDOT enjoyed a presumption of consistency
with the NCP.173 Therefore, WSDOT reasonably could have be-
lieved that "with the benefit of the presumption, its actions would
satisfy the requirements of the NCP. 1 74 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit did not view the trial court's denial of attorney's fees pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) to be an "abuse of
discretion. "1 75
Id. at 806. Similarly, the third requested admission was found to be of "no substan-
tial importance" because there is no provision for a community relations plan as a
remedial action required in the NCP. Id.
The standard of review on a denial of attorney's fees is "abuse of discretion."
See Marchand v. Mercy Medical Ctr., 22 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that
pursuant to review for "abuse of discretion," Ninth Circuit would not reverse "un-
less we have a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment"). In WSDOT, the court reviewed the denial of attorney's fees
incurred in proving appellant's noncompliance with the NCP, and attorney's fees
incurred in obtaining depositions that were not subsequently used at trial.
WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 806.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. While Hart Crowser had conducted tests to ascertain the nature and
extent of the threat posed by the contaminated material, the interagency team had
also at the very least informally examined numerous alternatives before deciding
on a course of action. Id. In this manner, WSDOT had followed the requirements
of the NCP at the most general level. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. "[T] he questions of whether WSDOT was entitled to a presumption
of consistency with the NCP, and the effect of that presumption, were unsettled."
Id.
174. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 806.
175. Id,
1996]
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WSDOT
While the conclusions of the Ninth Circuit in Washington State
Department of Transportation v. Washington Natural Gas may have pro-
duced the correct result, its decision rests on inconsistent and in-
complete reasoning. The WSDOT court held that although
WSDOT is a "State" within the meaning of CERCLA for the pur-
pose of a cost recovery action, WSDOT is nevertheless unable to
recover its response costs incurred in the cleanup of the contami-
nated construction site because its actions were inconsistent with
the NCP. 176 The WSDOT court also held that the prevailing defend-
ants were unable to recover attorney's fees incurred by proving
WSDOT's noncompliance with the NCP.177
A. The Plain Meaning of "State"
The Ninth Circuit correctly held that WSDOT, as a state
agency, is a "State" within the meaning of CERCLA. In so holding,
the Ninth Circuit properly followed its established policy that the
plain language is the starting point with an issue of statutory con-
struction. 178 The plain language meaning of the term "State" nec-
essarily includes "state agencies" such as WSDOT, which are the
media through which states act.179  Further, because the term
"State" has an established and clear meaning which includes state
agencies, this conclusion is not contradicted by the statutory lan-
guage of CERCLA. The Ninth Circuit properly concluded that it
need not look to the legislative history of CERCLA for guidance. 180
176. Id. at 797.
177. Id. at 806.
178. Id. at 800. See Reardon v. United States, 922 F.2d 28, 33 (Ist Cir. 1990)
("construing CERCIA, 'the primary focus of attention must be the statute it-
self' "). For a discussion of the plain language meaning of the term "state" see
supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
179. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 800. The term "state" is "sometimes applied ... to
governmental agencies authorized by [a] state .... " Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990)).
180. Prior to WSDOT, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the principle of statu-
tory construction that when a "term at issue has a settled meaning, we must infer
that the legislature meant to incorporate the established meaning, unless the stat-
ute dictates otherwise." S & M Inv. Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911
F.2d 324, 326 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087 (1991) (citations ommit-
ted). Moreover, the S & M court recognized that a court should look to the legis-
lative history to determine only whether there is "clearly expressed legislative
intention" to the contrary when the plain language of the statute appears to settle
the question of the language's meaning. S & MK 911 F.2d at 327 (citing INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (citations omitted)). City of Phila.
v. Stepan Chem. Co. supports the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the term "state,"
declaring that because the language of CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A) "clearly and
unambiguously refers only to recovery costs incurred by the 'United States Govern-
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Moreover, in order to further the broad remedial purposes of CER-
CLA, a court does not need to extend the definition of "State" be-
yond state agencies to encompass municipalities or political
subdivisions.' 81 For the court to do so would be (1) illogical; (2)
beyond the legislative framework; and (3) contrary to the congres-
sional intent of treating public and private parties differently. 8 2 Al-
lowing WSDOT to be considered a "State" within the meaning of
CERCLA aids the state of Washington to respond promptly and ef-
fectively to environmental emergencies.18 3
Although the plain language of the statute supported the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the term "State," the court still
needed to address the defendants' argument to confine the term
"State" as used in section 107 to state agencies empowered to take
ment' or a 'State,' and as there is no clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, I must regard the language used to be conclusive." 713 F. Supp. 1484,
1489 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing In re Lorraine Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421, 427 n.3
No. 88-160 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting National Freight, Inc. v. Larson, 760 F.2d 499,
503 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985))).
Nevertheless, the legislative history of CERCLA would not have provided the
Ninth Circuit with much guidance. Numerous decisions have commented on the
unreliability of CERCLA's legislative history as a guide to the legislative intent. See
generally Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st
Cir. 1986) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for... an indefinite,
if not contradictory, legislative history.") (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.
Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985)). In City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp.
1484, 1489 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1989), Judge Ditter found the legislative history to the
SARA amendments to be rather inconclusive, stating "[w] hile Congress ... could
have explicitly amended the definition of 'state' to exclude municipalities, it could
have as easily amended the definition to include such units of local government.
Instead, it chose to do nothing, leaving to the courts the interpretation of the
term."
181. For a discussion of those decisions finding "State" to include municipali-
ties and political subdivisions, see supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
The Ninth Circuit, in deciding that those decisions which concluded that
"State" does not include a "municipality," avoided case law that has found a state to
be a "person" under CERCLA. In Stilltoe v. Almy Brothers, Inc., the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York found that the Department of
Conservation for the State of New York was a "person" within the meaning of CER-
CLA. 759 F. Supp. 95, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1991). The Stilltoe court looked to the statu-
tory definition of "person" set forth at CERCLA § 101 (21) which includes the term
"state." Id.
CERCLA § 101(21) defines "person" as: "[t]he term 'person' means an indi-
vidual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, com-
mercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." CERCLA § 101(21), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(21) (emphasis added).
182. See Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 472 (D. Mass.
1991). Congressional intent to treat a public party differently from a private party
in response recovery actions is evident from the different burdens of proof re-
quired by CERCLA §§ 107(a) (4) (A) and 107(a) (4) (B). Id.
183. For a discussion of the broad remedial purposes of CERCLA, see supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
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remedial or removal action pursuant to section 104.184 The Ninth
Circuit's rejection of this argument is in accordance with the over-
whelming weight of authority. Precedents conclude that neither
states nor private parties are required to obtain government ap-
proval prior to entering into a cleanup action. 185 Again, a narrow
interpretation of CERCLA to include such a requirement impedes
states from responding quickly and effectively to environmental
emergencies, one of CERCLA's main goals. 186 Moreover, such an
interpretation would go against the plain language rule because
CERCLA does not explicitly indicate that a party seeking recovery
of response costs must obtain governmental approval before under-
taking a cleanup action, nor does it "provide any mechanism
through which a party could seek approval from . . . [governmen-
tal] entities to undertake significant action with respect to a con-
taminated [site]. "187 Finally, such a requirement would place a
significant burden on governmental entities which would be forced
to devote much of their limited resources to the review of a party's
cleanup plan. 88
B. The Ninth Circuit's Inconsistent Determination that
WSDOT's Actions Did Not Comply with the NCP
In judging a cleanup action under the deferential "arbitrary
and capricious" standard, a court looks for glaring omissions or mis-
takes. '8 9 When it decided not to remand the case for remedy of the
district court's error of applying the incorrect legal standard, the
184. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 800-01. Section 104 "bars Superfund expenditures
for remedial actions unless the state in which the release occurs enters into a coop-
erative agreement with the federal government." Id. at 800.
In essence, defendants' argument was that WSDOT should not be considered
a "State" under § 107(a) (4) (A) because it had not acted pursuant to authority
from the federal government, in particular, EPA. Id. at 801.
185. Id. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text for discussion of private
parties not needing to obtain prior government approval in order to begin
cleanup action. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text for discussion of pub-
lic parties (states) not needing to obtain prior government approval in order to
begin response actions and seek recovery of response costs.
186. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112
(D. Minn. 1982). For a discussion of the broad remedial goals of CERCLA, see
supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
187. Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 694-95
(9th Cir. 1988).
188. Id. at 695. "There is no indication in the statute that Congress contem-
plated placing this burden on state and local governments." Id.
189. See United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1424
(6th Cir. 1991). For a discussion of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard and its
application to cleanup actions under CERCLA, see supra notes 74-89 and accom-
panying text.
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Ninth Circuit concluded that WSDOT's actions were so inconsistent
with the 1985 NCP as to reach the level of being "arbitrary and
capricious." 190 Although the Ninth Circuit.acknowledged the arbi-
trary and capricious standard is deferential, the court in fact substi-
tuted its own judgment for that of WSDOT by concluding that
WSDOT's actions did not comply with the NCP. 191
Determining that the case should not be remanded to the dis-
trict court, the Ninth Circuit bypassed a line of cases that hold that
when the government is the party seeking recovery of response
costs, the defendants bear the burden of proving that the govern-
ment's cleanup actions are inconsistent with the applicable NCP.1 92
The Ninth Circuit had previously ruled, however, in Wickland Oil
Terminals v. Asarco, Inc.,193 that a defending party must prove that a
government party's cleanup action, as a whole, is inconsistent with
the NCP.194 Rather than forcing WNG to prove WSDOT's actions
inconsistent with the NCP, the Ninth Circuit determined, on its
own, that WSDOT's response actions failed the inconsistency
test.1 95 At the same time, the court acknowledged that at a basic
190. Washington State Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 59
F.3d 793, 805 (9th Cir. 1995). The court concluded:
Looking at the situation as a whole, we have no difficulty concluding that
WSDOT's actions were inconsistent with the NCP. WSDOT failed to assess
accurately both the nature and the extent of the threat posed by the pres-
ence of PAHs in the soil, failed to evaluate alternatives in the matter pre-
scribed in the NCP, and failed to provide opportunity for public
comment.
Id. (emphasis added).
191. For a discussion of cases discussing the "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard as a deferential one by which courts should not substitute their own judg-
ment for that of an agency, see supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion of cases holding that the defendant bears the burden of
proving inconsistency with the NCP when the government is the party seeking re-
covery of response costs, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
193. 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
194. Id. at 891. The Wickland court's conclusion agreed with EPA's interpreta-
tion for a defending party to prove a public party's response action as being incon-
sistent with the NCP, the defendant must do more than just simply point out
"inconsistencies" with the NCP. Id. Rather, there should be a "review of the
cleanup as a whole, not use of the NCP as a checklist." Reply of Appellant, at 12,
Washington State Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793
(9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-35088) (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8794 (March 8, 1990)).
195. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 802-05. The court explained:
We have concluded that ... WNG et al. should have borne the burden of
proving that WSDOT's actions were inconsistent with the burden of prov-
ing that WSDOT's actions were inconsistent with the NCP. Nonetheless
... we conclude it is clear that under the proper assignment of the bur-
den of proof, the district court would have reached the same decision.
Therefore, the district court's error was harmless.
Id. at 801.
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level WSDOT had complied with the NCP-a level basic enough to
justify a reasonable belief that WSDOT might successfully recover
its response costs at trial. 196
In summarily deciding that WSDOT's actions did not comply
with the NCP, the Ninth Circuit did not pay sufficient attention to
the "consistent" and "not inconsistent" language in section 107 of
CERCLA. 197 Instead, the Ninth Circuit took a bold step in stating
that an environmental cleanup can be consistent with the applica-
ble NCP, even if the party undertaking the cleanup does not refer
to the NCP.198 Thus, to some extent, the Ninth Circuit was able to
discern WSDOT's path of conduct. Consequently, following the
United States Supreme Court's logic articulated in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance,'99 it is possible
that the district court, on remand, may have also determined that
on some level, WSDOT's actions did comply with the NCP, and
awarded recovery of some or all WSDOT's response costs.
C. The Ninth Circuit's Denial of Attorney's Fees
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly denied the award of attor-
ney's fees to the defendants, its reasoning was somewhat innovative.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since WSDOT had "reasonably be-
lieved" that it might prevail at trial, and that because WSDOT, at
the time of trial, still did not know whether it enjoyed a statutory
presumption of consistency, WNG should not be entitled to recover
attorney's fees incurred in its efforts to prove WSDOT's noncompli-
ance with the NCP.200 The court's analysis in examining the issue
of attorney's fees according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
rather than adhering to CERCLA is puzzling.201 The American
196. Id. at 806. "Although the question is close, we conclude that WSDOT
could have reasonably believed that it had complied with the applicable provisions
of the NCP." Id.
197. The difference in this language has been interpreted by several courts to
mean that Congress intended for two different standards to apply with respect to
private and public party cleanup recovery actions. For a discussion of the "consis-
tent" and "not inconsistent" language of CERCLA § 107, see supra notes 37-50, 58-
65 and accompanying text.
198. WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 803.
199. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
200. Id. at 806. This holding is consistent with previous decisions of the Ninth
Circuit in its interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. In Marchand v.
Mercy Medical Center, 22 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1994), the court stated that Rule 37
'mandates an award of expenses unless an exception applies." 22 F.3d 933, 936
(9th Cir. 1994).
201. For a discussion of the court's reasoning in denying attorney's fees to
Washington Natural Gas et al. pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c),
see supra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
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Rule concerning recovery of attorney's fees provides that courts
may not award fees to the prevailing party as costs or otherwise un-
less they are provided for by statute or an agreement between the
parties.202 When confronted with the issue of attorney's fees, the
Ninth Circuit did not acknowledge this rule in its opinion. Addi-
tionally, there was no mention of the recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,203 in which the
Court held that litigation-related attorney's fees are not recoverable
in a private party response recovery action under CERCLA.2 04
While the Supreme Court in Key Tronic had not addressed the issue
of whether a public party could recover litigation-related attorney's
fees under CERCLA, the inference can reasonably be made that
attorney's fees associated with proving non-compliance in a public
party cost-recovery suit- would also be non-recoverable. 20 5
VI. IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit's decision in WSDOT will negatively affect
environmental cleanup efforts by state and federal agencies and/or
governments. Instead of setting a predictable standard against
which public parties may confidently measure their response ac-
tions, the internal inconsistencies of the Ninth Circuit's decision
reflect uncertainty. This uncertainty is a product of the federal
court precedent setting forth various interpretations of what con-
stitutes a cleanup action which is "not inconsistent" or "consistent"
with the NCP.20 6 Without more than the presently existing minimal
legislative and administrative guidance to aid the federal courts in
202. Alyeska v. Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See
supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text for discussion of "American Rule" re-
garding recovery of attorney's fees in private actions.
A strict application of the "American Rule" would require CERCLA to ex-
pressly state that private parties are entitled to recover attorney's fees. Mullins,
supra note 41, at 1529. "Whether attorney's fees are recoverable depends on the
judicial determination of whether there is specific statutory authority under CER-
CIA to provide such recovery." Id.
203. 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
204. Id. at 1967. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's rationale in denying
litigation-related attorney's fees in a private party cost recovery action under CER-.
CILA, see supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
205. See Mullins, supra note 41, at 1563. "[T] he fact that Congress knew how
to expressly provide for attorney's fees and did so in sections 113(0 and
106(b) (2) (E) but failed to do so in government response actions reveals legislative
intent not to allow attorney's fees in such actions." Id.
206. For a discussion of the internal inconsistencies in the WSDOT court's
analysis, see supra notes 176-205 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
various interpretations of what constitutes a "not inconsistent" or "consistent"
cleanup action with CERCLA, see supra notes 37-50, 58-65 and accompanying text.
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distinguishing between the language of CERCLA sections
107(a)(4)(A) and 107(a)(4)(B), courts will continue to decide
cases on an ad-hoc basis.2 07 As a result of these case-by-case deci-
sions, public parties such as WSDOT will be discouraged from
promptly responding to environmental emergencies for fear that
the reviewing court may substitute its own judgment for that of the
agency and subjectively conclude that its response actions are "in-
consistent" with the NCP. As one court has recently remarked, "[a]
CERCLA regime which rewards indifference to environmental
hazards and discourages voluntary efforts at waste cleanup cannot
be what Congress had in mind."20 8
In WSDOT, the Ninth Circuit abided by the general rule deny-
ing the recovery of attorney's fees to the prevailing party.209 How-
ever, its analysis of the issue based on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure rather than CERCLA, suggests that the United. States
Supreme Court or Congress should address the question of
whether the "all costs" language of CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (A)
encompasses litigation-related attorney's fees incurred by the pre-
vailing party in a public party response recovery action.210
The time has come for consistency and predictability in analyz-
ing public party response recovery actions. Without it, public par-
ties will have no incentive to promptly and effectively respond to
environmental emergencies. Rather, they will fear expending sig-
nificant efforts and money with the distinct possibility of not being
able to recoup their losses. Such a situation would be disastrous, as
207. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578
(D. Md. 1986) (stating "the structure of section 107(a), like so much of this hastily
patched together compromise Act, is not a model of statutory clarity"); see also
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989)
(commenting that broad language and legislative history of CERCLA provide little
guidance in determining intended meaning of section 107(a)).
208. Nurad, Inc. v. William Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845-46 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992).
209. For a discussion of the general rule concerning the award of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party in a litigation, see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis denying the recovery of attor-
ney's fees incurred by Washington Natural Gas et al. to prove WSDOT's noncom-
pliance with the NCP, see supra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
210. The United States Supreme Court declined to consider this question in
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, where the Court concluded that litigation-related
attorney's fees are not recoverable by the prevailing party under CERCLA. 114 S.
Ct. 1960 (1994). For a discussion of the Key Tronic decision, see supra notes 93-97
and accompanying text.
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it would defeat the whole purpose of CERCLA, that of
"facilitat[ing] the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites."2 1
Teresa Saint-Amour
211. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); H.R. Rp. No. 1016(I), 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 6119, 6125.
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